

R E A S O N S

FOR KEEPING

GUADALOUPE at a Peace,

PREFERABLE TO

C A N A D A,

EXPLAINED IN

FIVE LETTERS,

FROM A

GENTLEMAN in GUADALOUPE,

TO HIS

FRIEND in LONDON.

L O N D O N:

Printed for M. COOPER, in Pater-Noster-Row

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REA SON

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CANADA

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Printed by M. Courcier, at the Crown and Sun, in Pall-mall.

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M D C C L X X

1762



R E A S O N S

F O R

Keeping GUADALOUPE, &c.



L E T T E R I.

*From a Gentleman at Guadaloupe, to his Friend
in London.*

S I R,

THE different opinions of the people concerning the value of Canada, and the value of Guadaloupe to Great-Britain, have occasioned many disputes in private and public, in which private views have too often influenced the debate: those who are for acquiring all Canada, and giving up Guadaloupe, and every thing else, argue in this manner; That no terms with the French can be secure or lasting; at the very time they are making a peace, they are contriving how to break it, and will do so as soon as any opportunity occurs to do it to advantage; That we entered into the war only upon account of America, that the French invaded our properties

ties there, and were long contriving to do it: now that we have beaten them out of all that country, what we did never claim, as well as what we did claim, therefore we ought to keep all America, as the greatest acquisition we can make, or ever was made; for if we allow them the smallest footing even in Canada itself, we can never be secure, they will drive us out of that country. That the trade of North-America is the great fountain of all the British wealth and power; that of late years it furnishes and employs so many ships, and so many sailors, makes so great a consumption of the produce of Great-Britain, sends so much of its produce to the sugar islands, and pours in such a tide of wealth from the West-Indies upon Britain, as enables her to make the figure she now does, to the rest of the world: That if all North-America were our own, she could be drawn into no more wars on that account, our trade there would rise to the highest pitch, and that country so extensive, so rich, and full of so many lakes and rivers fit for navigation, would soon raise the power and naval strength of Great-Britain, to a degree beyond any power on earth.

That the furr-trade might be entirely our own;
 That one ship of the Hudson-Bay company is often so rich as to bring home more value than ten sugar ships;
 That we have sufficiency of the sugar islands already;
 That Jamaica alone, if it were properly cultivated, can afford more sugar than England wants, it sends home near 40,000 hogsheads every year, when the third part is not cultivated; That Guadaloupe is a place of no significancy compared with Jamaica, and could add very little strength or wealth to Great-Britain; That the French have long out-done us in the hats, a trade that we may have entirely to ourselves, by acquiring Canada; and that if we leave the French the smallest footing or possession there, we never can be secure, or
 safe

safe in the rest; we have done nothing, but must always be liable to repeat the same expence.

Those who wish the keeping of Guadaloupe, answer as follows: That Guadaloupe we certainly have, and that Canada we have not, the fate of it is still dubious, that all the reasoning before-mentioned is sophistical and unsolid; That the advantages of North-America to Britain, exclusive of Canada, are very great; why join them all to Canada, of itself worth little or nothing, but to give it weight, which it has not of itself; if our barrier in America, shall be fixt by treaty to the certain limits we insist upon, and Cape-Briton retain'd or demolish'd, we are in a much better situation there than ever, which would render America of much more advantage to us than it was in former times, and more secure, nay as secure as the instability of human affairs can admit; The benefit of North-America to Britain does not depend upon Canada at all, it is a frothy and false argument, Canada can add nothing but, First, A little improvement of the furr-trade, which might be in very great perfection without it; Secondly, Preventing the French from disturbing us in that quarter of the world for some time, and even that argument is equally strong for taking the Mississippi, otherwise it is not conclusive.

But as it is argued that the French will never be at peace with us, it must follow that when they cannot make war in America they must disturb us in Europe; now let those gentlemen answer, Whether we have more advantage over the French by a war in America or a war in Flanders, when they have Ostend, &c. in their hands? The present war compared with those of King William, Queen Anne, and the war 1744, soon solves that question, the sugar trade is far preferable to the furr-trade; what does a few hats signify, compared with serving ourselves and other countries with that article of luxury sugar, the consumption of which

is daily increasing both in America and Europe, and become one of the necessaries of life ? Jamaica has not increased in sugars these thirty years past, and never can increase much, as the greatest part of it is so mountainous, that it is not capable of culture, and cannot answer the expence in many places, of carrying the sugars over mountains to be shipped, though they have made a monopoly for themselves of that commodity, of a long time past, they must now be the more reluctant to part with it.

It is our sugar islands that raise the value of North-America, and pours in such wealth upon the mother-country ; the more we have of those islands, America becomes from that cause the more important and valuable, and England the richer : in America we have more than enough, in the sugar islands a great deal too little, the nearer they can be proportioned to one another the better for both, and the more trade and wealth for England ; the furr-trade does not employ the hundredth part of the shipping and seamen that the sugar trade does.

The having all North-America to ourselves, by acquiring Canada, dazzles the eyes, and blinds the understandings of the giddy and unthinking people, as it is natural for the human mind to grasp at every appearance of wealth and grandeur, yet it is easy to discover that such a peace might soon ruin Britain : I say the acquisition of Canada would be destructive, because such a country as North-America, ten times larger in extent than Britain, richer soil in most places, all the different climates you can fancy, all the lakes and rivers for navigation one could wish, plenty of wood for shipping, and as much iron, hemp, and naval stores, as any part of the world ; such a country at such a distance, could never remain long subject to Britain ; you have taught them the art of war, and put arms in

in their hands, and they can furnish themselves with every thing in a few years, without the assistance of Britain, they are always grumbling and complaining against Britain, even while they have the French to dread, what may they not be supposed to do if the French is no longer a check upon them; you must keep a numerous standing army to over-awe them; these troops will soon get wives and possessions, and become Americans; thus from these measures you lay the surest foundation of unpeopling Britain, and strengthening America to revolt; a people who must become more licentious from their liberty, and more factious and turbulent from the distance of the power that rules them; one must be very little conversant in history, and totally unacquainted with the passions and operations of the human mind, who cannot foresee those events as clearly as any thing can be discovered, that lies concealed in the womb of time; it is no gift of prophecy, it is only the natural and unavoidable consequences of such and such measures, and must appear so to every man whose head is not too much affected with popular madness or political enthusiasm.

But without dipping too deep in futurity, pray what can Canada yield to Britain, in this or any subsequent age, but a little extension of the furr-trade? whereas Guadaloupe can furnish as much sugar, cotton, rum and coffee, as all the islands we have put together, and consume a vast quantity of the British and American produce, from which trade the shipping and naval strength of Britain must greatly increase, without any allowance for the cinnamon trade, which of itself may bring a good deal of wealth to the mother-country, as we have the wild cinnamon in common with the other islands, so we have also the true genuine cinnamon-tree, and have sent home to England samples of it, as good as any the Dutch have.

The consumption of sugar is daily increasing, both in Europe and America, and we cannot at this day serve ourselves with that article, but are we not to endeavour to serve foreign markets if we can? Did ever the French bring half so much wealth to their country from hats as from their sugar islands? To say we have sugar enough, is to say we have trade enough, a new doctrine truly, and if so, what use have we for Canada? In a word, it is most obvious to every impartial eye, that the increase of the sugar islands is particularly the interest of Britain, she is there too weak, and as those islands bring most wealth both to Britain and America, so from their weakness they can never be in any danger of revolting; and that every person, as soon as he can make a fortune there, comes home to the mother country and enjoys it; witness the number of the proprietors of the sugar islands that reside at London, and many of them sit in parliament; if they dread Guadaloupe as a rival to their private interest, they must at the same time own, it is a great acquisition to the public wealth and strength. Thus Guadaloupe, one of the greatest acquisitions ever Britain made, acquires many powerful enemies from private views, and has nothing to plead but her public utility and advantage, often found too feeble an opponent to the private interest of a few.

But to conclude, nothing can secure Britain so much against the revolting of North-America, as the French keeping some footing there, to be a check upon them, if the peace be made with any tolerable attention to our barrier in America, as we may be most certain it will, France must ever after be an enemy too feeble to be dreaded in that corner of the world; but if we were to acquire all Canada, we should soon find North-America itself too powerful, and too populous to be long governed by us at this distance; we have often, too often, wasted our blood and treasure to raise up
other

other powers to wealth and strength, only to be once our enemies ; it were much to be wished that we could take warning, and do so no more.

After writing what is above, some new arguments in favour of Canada have appeared in this part of the world, by the Gentleman's Magazine for the month of May. The publisher of that Magazine has ushered it in with full approbation from himself, that it is written with great force of argument, and compleat knowledge of the subject, from which we may conclude the paragraphs given us are the choicest of the work ; the first remarkable passage is, " We want security that the French shall not drive us out of that country of " America." Can any man read or answer this without derision at a time we have driven them out of it almost entirely ? And when they began the war with a thousand advantages they never can have again, and when the author admits we have ten times the number of people they have in that country, but granting we should drive them out of Canada, will not these people retire and take shelter in Mississippi ? From that circumstance will not Mississippi be more populous and more dangerous, and all his apprehensions be renewed from that quarter, they will drive us out of America. It is not the extent of territory, but the number of people, that makes a country formidable ; Does he require no security that they shall not drive us out of Britain ? It is America only seems his care.

He has next at great length given us the Indian method of making war, and how little our forts and artillery can serve as a security to our settlements, but will he take time to reflect how these Indians became our enemies ? By our neglecting to protect them, by our allowing the French to build forts to over-awe them, even upon our own property. It then became their interest to adhere to the French, but now that the
scene

Scene is changed, that we are in possession of these forts, that we are masters of that country, and that we only can protect them, those Indians must and will be ours from the strongest motives of any, that of self-interest, and which rules them as much as any people on earth, so that all the terror he would raise from those Indians, in place of frightening us, becomes so much additional strength to us, thus his own doctrine is undone by the arguments he throws out to support it, which must often happen when ingenuity and fancy are let loose to argue *in vita Minerva*.

The third point advanced is, "That though America should encrease to a hundred million of souls there would be no danger still, they would depend upon and be subservient to seven or eight million of souls in the North at such a distance."

One is really out of countenance to answer such absurdities in a serious manner, to state them is sufficient to discredit them, if any man can agree to them very great is his faith.

The fourth maxim is very ingenious, "That though none of the American gentlemen come to England to spend their fortunes, it is of no consequence at all; is it of any importance, says he, to the English farmer, whether his beef, pork, and tongues are eat fresh at London, or salted at Barbadoes, and so of his cheese, butter and ale, &c.?" What can all that sophistry tend to? Does he know so little of America or the West-Indies, as to believe that the gentlemen of fortune in those countries live upon salted provisions from England? In America they have as good venison, in many countries beef, mutton, and pork, as they have in England, and as good poultry of all kinds. In the sugar islands men of fortune have as voluptuous tables as they have in Britain, of fresh meat
and

and poultry, fresh fish of many kinds, and plenty of turtle; Can he either persuade himself or the world, that a man spending twelve or fifteen thousand pounds a year, with opulence and taste in London, does England no more service than a man who spends it in America or the West-Indies, where at his table he does not consume fifty pounds worth of British vivres all the year round? Or does a gentleman of fortune in America or the West-Indies, keep twelve or twenty servants in his house living like lords, and cloathed in the best manufactures of England, as he does when he lives in London? In the West-Indies indeed he is surrounded with as many half-naked negroes in his house, eating the low growths of the country; that negroes are allowed, but this we are told is great force of argument, and compleat knowledge of the subject, though to most people I should think those arguments will appear to have no force or conclusion at all, being founded upon false maxims, they become only evasions of the truth; that cause must be very weak indeed, where learning, ingenuity and eloquence, can suggest nothing stronger to support it than such unsolid sophistry.

His fifth maxim is, that "Our trade to the West-India islands is undoubtedly a very valuable one, but it has long been at a stand, our sugar planters, limited by the scantiness of territory, says he, cannot increase much, an evil that keeping Guadaloupe cannot remedy." Now since the sugar islands are so valuable, and long at a stand from the scantiness of territory, does it not follow that more territory should be acquired, if ever an opportunity to do it, rather than when we have got possession of such territory we should give it up; if our sugar islands are undeniably very valuable, as he asserts, and that all the islands we have do not yield 90,000 hogsheads of sugar yearly, or above it? Is an island or territory that can certainly
yield

yield 150,000 hogsheds a year, to be despised and given up, because we want more territory? Will it make no addition to supply that scantiness he complains of? I long to see how he proves that Guadaloupe cannot increase our sugar trade, if he knows any thing at all about Guadaloupe, he will find this point hard to prove, that 150 is less than 90, or that 150 added to 90 will not increase the number; as subtle as his sophistry is, it will meet with obstructions in this proof, unless he come to the persuasive assertion, that Guadaloupe produces nothing at all, such is the conclusive force of these arguments, extracted from this celebrated piece, by its admirer, the author of the Gentleman's Magazine.

The sixth assertion is, " That the peopling of
 " America does not diminish the people of England,
 " that it does drain Britain of inhabitants, he says, is
 " founded upon ignorance of the nature of population
 " in new countries."

It were to be wished at least that he were right in this, or that his knowledge in population were communicated to the people of England, as Britain is certainly not encreasing in its number of inhabitants, and that the number of people is the great wealth and strength of every country where industry abounds; if two countries trading and dealing so deep with one another, the one encreasing so fast in people, as our author admits America does, and the other diminishing, notwithstanding all the advantages of manufactories, trade and agriculture, which have so greatly advanced of late years; the cause is past doubt, the one is draining the other of people, or which is much the same in the end, the one encreasing so fast must soon be master of the other, that is diminishing it, or at best standing still.

If

If this ingenious gentleman had been as much a friend to North-America as he would seem to be, he might easily have discovered that the acquisition of Guadaloupe must raise the value of North-America, and the trade and wealth of Britain, ten times more than all Canada can ever do (without making any allowance for the cinnamon trade;) that Guadaloupe we have, and Canada yet dubious, so those gentlemen calculate before the time; but it is the value of Guadaloupe, not its insignificancy, sets so many pens afloat, and so much eloquence employed to blind the eyes, and mislead the understandings of the people of England from being sensible of their true interest, while there is any choice in their power to make, when it is considered, what opposition all other sugar islands make to the keeping Guadaloupe, what a powerful people they are, how many sit in parliament, and how many of the cities of London, Liverpool, and Bristol, are connected with them in that trade, it can be no surprize that the struggle and opposition should be great, and all arts employed in such a cause, where from jealousy and mistakes, they fancy the sugar, and other valuable produce of Guadaloupe, will hurt their private interests, or fortunes in the other islands; an effect it will not produce to any sensible degree, while we have so many foreign markets to go to; though indeed it might put a stop to monopolies of that commodity, and make sugar as reasonable in England as in other countries; but the more our other islands dread the value and wealth of Guadaloupe, the reasons for our keeping it becomes the stronger to the nation in general: to them I address myself, I hope they will consider that the many advantages, fairly and justly stated, arising to the nation from Guadaloupe, is not all the benefit, as it must be noticed, That so much of the sugar trade taken from France, and added to Britain, must increase the difference of the political balance, in a duplicate ratio; a pound taken out of one scale and
put

put in the other makes two pounds difference in the balance.

As I have lived on the spot in Guadaloupe for some time, so from some intimacy with the Custom-House, and Naval-Office, I have had more opportunities to know the export and import of this island, than any body who hath yet written on the subject ; both what it has produced, and what it can produce ; and I look upon it as my duty to attempt the unveiling of the truth to my country, from those clouds of darkness and error, that so many able pens have been long employed to involve it in ; and if I am allowed, I may soon oblige the world with a more accurate description of these conquered islands, as well as an authentic account of the export and import of the place, with this observation, that facts are stubborn things, they will neither bend to the force of faction and private views, nor will they yield to sophistry and eloquence.

Now to conclude, let us suppose that we have sugar enough to serve ourselves, as has been asserted by those gentlemen, and that Guadaloupe can produce one hundred and fifty thousand hogsheads every year, a fact that can be as distinctly proved, as the value of any piece of ground in England, what grain it can yield with common culture ; those 150,000 hogsheads must be manufactured in Britain, and exported to foreign markets, in which case it is not over valued at 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ the hoghead, and so returns to England two millions one hundred thousand pounds annually ; include what the cinnamon trade may be, with the immense quantity of coffee and cotton, indico, cocoa, ginger, &c. exported from this island, together with the British manufactories imported here, with the beef, wheat, pork, butter, cheese, ale, salt-fish, &c. a man can then frame some judgment of the value of this place, better than by a thousand such sophisticated and evasive treatises,

treatises, as those that have appeared in opposition to Guadaloupe, when subtilty and resentment are used to overturn all the solid maxims of policy and government, that have stood the test of so many past ages, and confirmed by so long experience.

It methinks the nation might rest safe and satisfied in the well-known ability and integrity of such a ministry as we are blest with ; a ministry who have in so distinguished a manner carried on the war, with fortitude, vigour and judgment ; who have shewn so just a knowledge of the true interest of their country, and where her natural strength and vigour lay : who could judge where to strike a fatal blow amongst the richest spots in the world, while our enemies and our own country were amusing themselves with mere empty shadows ? I say we might remain well satisfied that such a ministry would make a peace suitable to, and consistent with those just sentiments of the true interest of the nation, that have shone so conspicuously in managing the war : but no sooner had we so unexpectedly got footing in Canada, than those foes to Guadaloupe, one of the richest sugar islands in the world, and which we were actually in possession of ; this it was thought might divert the edge of the war from these valuable sugar islands, where France was so sensibly hurt, and so unable to defend : and thus the two great men at the helm were addressed, or rather dictated to as school-boys, and their instructions given them with a haughtiness very unbecoming that dignity and confidence they had so justly merited of their country ; it were to be wished those gentlemen would desist, and leave the making the peace to those much abler heads, who have so happily conducted the war.

I am, &c.

The

The Sugar Islands yield as follows :

	Hhds.
Barbadoes, at a medium, annually	12,000
Antigua, ditto	15,000
Montserrat, ditto	3,000
Nevis, ditto	3,400
St. Kitt's, ditto	14,000
Anguilla, ditto	50
Tortora, ditto	2,000
Jamaica, over-valued, at	40,000
	89,450



L E T-



L E T T E R II.

S I R,

* * * * * S Canada and Guadaloupe have long been
 * A * the subject of conversation in England and
 * * * elsewhere, so it has occasioned much writ-
 * * * ing and many long pamphlets of late to
 very little purpose ; where they have generally left the
 merits of the case to follow shadows and phantoms of
 their own imagination, or to darken those points they
 offer to clear up to the world. The first of those that
 appeared in print, in a letter to two very great men,
 says, " We have sugar islands enough of our own
 " already ; that Jamaica of itself sends home 40,000
 " hogsheads every year, when the third part of it is
 " not cultivated : " the next of these writings, in sup-
 port of the first, being answers to the remarks on the
 first, says, " That our trade to the West-Indies is un-
 " doubtedly a very valuable one ; but it has long been
 " at a stand, our sugar-planters, limited by the scan-
 " tiness of territory, cannot increase much." Now,
 this last must appear to be a very satisfactory answer
 to the first, though they are both written on the same
 side of the argument, and to support the same cause ;
 but such contradictions, when they do happen, are
 the plainest and most convincing proofs, that these
 gentlemen are both arguing and maintaining points in
 opposition to conviction, reason, and truth ; for these

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are

are always uniform, and never contradict themselves; all methods have been used to prevent our acquiring more territory in the West-Indies, and Canada chosen to be the object proper to put in opposition to Guadaloupe, and this was done at a time we had but just got a little footing in that country, which we cannot yet say we have conquered, though it is hoped we may before this campaign is at an end. Presumption surely it was to determine so early upon the fate of a country that we had not conquered, but as Canada was of itself of very little significancy to us, who have so many finer countries in America that we cannot cultivate, therefore all America, and the trade of it, were joined to Canada, to increase the giddiness of unthinking people; and we are told, without Canada we could not be sure of any thing in America; if we left the French in possession of any part of it, they would drive us out of America altogether; no treaties, no forts were capable of defending our possessions there, nothing but having Canada can secure those gentlemen. Now is there any thing in all this sophistry that is consistent with common sense or truth? What security can any people have for their possessions, but treaties, forts, and superior strength, and we have all those on our side? What further security can we have, unless they propose to extirpate the French from the face of the earth, which is not in their power to do, nor justifiable if they could? All the arguments they use for taking Canada, are as conclusive for taking France and Mississippi, sure those false glosses and chimerical representations can impose upon no man of any reflection. Now let us remember how we begun the war: these authors have told us that the French had been contriving this war and preparing for it since the peace of Utrecht, but in a more particular manner since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748; that they had made alliances with all the Indians, and bound them fast in all shapes; that they had filled those

those forts, and all places of the country, with military stores, military men, engineers, arms, and all kinds of provisions, which, I believe, is pretty much the truth. Now since they began the war with so much attention and preparation on their side, and so much inadvertency on ours, and that we have, notwithstanding all these advantages, driven them out of all that country, and ruined their trade more than ever it was, can we tremble so much for them again? Can we be now afraid they will drive us out of America, when we shall have all these forts in our possession, and all those Indians at our beck, with whom, more than with their own people, they did us any hurt?

Those gentlemen admit to us that we have ten times the number of people in America that the French have. In what a dastardly shape do they represent their country, when they tell us, that one thousand French will drive ten thousand British out of America: has the behaviour of our countrymen at any time deserved such an aspersion? I think I may say without vanity, that they have at all times behaved as gallantly and as bravely as the French: shameful assertion! it never did happen, nor never will, those are phantoms of a piece with such as are hatched by old women to frighten children in the nursery. I may conclude then that we can safely maintain and cultivate our Plantations in North-America, and make them of much more utility to us than ever they have yet been, notwithstanding the French retaining some footing in Canada. Therefore Canada in the present dispute must stand upon its own legs, stripped of those imaginary properties of supporting and upholding all the rest of our colonies in North-America, who can well support themselves without it; it might indeed give us a little more of the furr-trade, but what is that compared with the sugar trade of the West-Indian islands; nay, it is

pretty obvious, that if our bounds and barrier in North-America are settled and established, as we have all along contended for, we must carry on even the furr-trade with more advantages than the French can do with Canada in their possession.

In the next place let us take a view of North-America with our own eyes, rather than with those magic glasses that some gentlemen hold out to you, and we shall find it to be a country of vast extent of territory, happy in all the circumstances that can promote trade, agriculture, and industry, advancing with hasty strides towards maturity, and multiplying in people. We shall not only find in it all the climates that we find at home, but many more and better. It can produce every plant, grain, fruit, cattle and poultry that Great-Britain does, and many that Britain cannot:

As America increases in people, so she must increase in arts and sciences, in manufactures and trade, while she has the same laws, liberties, and genius we have at home; the more she increases in these, the less she must want from Britain; the more she rises above a certain pitch, her utility and advantage to Britain must proportionably decrease. The period is possibly not at such a distance as some people may imagine, when they may refuse to send you their tobaccoes, but export them to foreign markets themselves; you might send fleets for some time to molest their coasts, but might find yourselves too feeble to send armies that could conquer; the more you waste your strength upon America with any power but France, the more you weaken yourself at home, and become the easier prey to your turbulent and restless European neighbours.

These hints I shall only throw out to my country at present, as subjects meriting some consideration, but have no necessity to build much upon them in the arguments

guments for keeping Guadaloupe, if in our power, rather than Canada.

Though any man who has bestowed the smallest reflection upon the causes of the rise, progress, and decline of ancient or modern states, kingdoms, or commonwealths, will be of opinion they are not imaginary phantoms, but favour more of political prudence than of temerity and fiction; the same causes will naturally produce the same effects that they have done a thousand years ago.

But waving those matters, I shall proceed to consider the advantages of North-America to Great-Britain; those that she has felt and may enjoy from cautious and prudent measures, at the same time not to forget from what fountains these advantages flow.

Those gentlemen have told us what is pretty true, that North America has raised the naval strength of Great-Britain by the number of ships and seamen it employs, that it consumes so much of the produce and manufactures of Great-Britain, sends so much of its own to the sugar islands as pours in such a tide of the wealth of the West-Indies on the mother country. It is as true that the West-Indies produces the wealth, as that America is part of the cause, as she sends to the sugar islands so much of her lumber, so much rice, salt fish, flour, and biscuit of all kinds, with cattle, and many other things, much cheaper than England can do, and by a nearer run; so she is supplied from the islands with sugar and rum, which she cannot want; molasses, which she stills into rum; coffee, ginger, cocoa, and several other things, from all which a great deal of shipping and seamen are employed: ask any man in most of our American plantations, if the sugar islands were sunk in the waters, or annihilated to-morrow morning, if the value of North-America would not fall one half, both

to itself and to Britain? Ask, if those West-India islands were doubled in extent and produce, if North-America would not thereby increase and double in value; its trade with these islands be doubled, as well as its trade with Britain. Look into any part of North-America, and you shall find gold and silver not frequent; but look into any of the sugar islands, and you will find what you purchase in England for a penny, you give sixpence for there, in many articles.

As those sugar islands consume near as much of the produce of Great-Britain as America itself does, so the increase of these islands, or the acquiring more territory there, must not only increase the consumption of the British produce, with the trade and shipping from thence; but also the consumption of the American produce, with the trade and shipping from the West-Indies to America, and from America to England: thus those islands being the common medium of import and export from Britain and America, it becomes the interest of both to acquire as much territory there as they possibly can, until we have what may answer the exports of Britain and America both, which is far from being the case at present; 30,000 acres in the West-Indies would increase the value of Britain and America both, more than 300,000 acres either in Europe or America could possibly do. It must appear then past dispute, that nothing can be more beneficial for Great-Britain and America jointly, than the increase of the sugar islands; it is there we are too weak; it is there the just proportion to be maintained amongst the three sails, and is defective for want of more territory, and calls aloud for us to retain Guadaloupe, if in our power to do it: an island pregnant with all the advantages and wealth we so greedily hunt after; an island that will produce more sugar, more coffee, and more cotton than all the islands we have put together. I am sensible I do not exaggerate, when I say, that Guadaloupe and its

its dependencies can, and will in a very few years, after being united to Britain, yield above 150,000 hogshheads of sugar annually, with rum or molasses in proportion; that its consumption of the produce of Britain is, and will continue to be very great.

I shall not here enlarge upon all the other profitable things this island can send home, as I am sensible what I have said of the sugar, is so far above the notions of Guadaloupe, that have been industriously spread through England, that the same pains will be taken to discredit it; but I must here say to my country, that I have considered it with attention; that I have been thought by the sugar planters in our islands, not defective in the knowledge of vegetation and culture of the ground: and that I have convinced many of them of some mistakes in their practice. But I do not rest my assertions there, I have conversed with many of the best sugar planters of our other islands, who have looked over Guadaloupe carefully and attentively with the same view, who have been many years planters in these islands we have, and lived in Guadaloupe since we had any footing there, and the opinions of those gentlemen were considerably above what I have said, and not below it.

From whom can England know the value of Guadaloupe, but from such, and who can so properly dispel those clouds of darkness and error that have been so industriously spread round it? Where can the truth be known, or objects viewed, but on the spot? Will a citize. of London, who never once saw a sugar plantation in his life, know better what Guadaloupe can produce, than those who have long practised in sugar plantations and viewed almost every spot of the island with an attention proper for qualifying them to judge of it? Or will the French records of the export of 70,000 hogshheads annually, have no weight, when they

had few people who understood the culture of the sugar plant, and not half sufficiency of negroes to work the ground? Do the people of England know, That Marie Galante is very near the extent of Antigua, without one mountain in it; that the extensive country of Grandterre has not a mountain, or an acre of bad soil in it; that Guadaloupe has only one ridge of mountains nigh Basseterre, very beneficial for grass and rains to all the country around? Will a farmer in England say, that two or three of them together cannot judge of a neighbouring farm what grain it may produce with ordinary culture, or what rent it should set for? Thus much briefly for Guadaloupe at present.

But now to apply it to the argument, since these three parties, Britain, North-America, and the West-Indies, are so inseparably linked in one trade and interest, and that the West-Indies, one of the three, is universally allowed to be so far deficient in extent of territory as thereby to confine and limit the trade and profit of the whole; does it not follow, that such an acquisition as Guadaloupe, to double the strength and utility of that weakest party, and bring it nearer to an equality with the other two, so as to answer more of their demands and exports, I say, will not such an acquisition double the value, trade, and wealth of all the three; so essentially and inseparably linked together in one unity of trade. The thing is clearer than light itself, if I may be allowed the expression, and yet people will be at so much pains to darken that light, only to lead their countrymen into a snare.

I shall not take upon me to say what we should keep or what we should give up; but I am pretty certain we have a great deal in our hands at present, and I have full confidence in our ministry, that they who have so prudently and so vigorously carried on the war, and thereby manifested to the world so distinguished a sense
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of the true interest of their country, will make a peace conformable to these maxims, and suitable to the interest of Great-Britain.

But we have at all times a French faction festering in our own bowels, particularly at such a juncture. If they cannot divert the war from the sugar islands, where France can be so mortally wounded, nor blind the nation as to the value of Guadaloupe, they talk next of the honour of a disinterested peace. Are we to have the honour to neglect our own interest, and prefer that of France, that the treaty of Utrecht may no longer blush? Has this any other meaning but to save the French in all shapes? Was it not our interest that engaged us in the war? Are we now to discard it, and throw it out of the question? Are we to act contrary to our interest or not, after we have carried on the war with a success beyond our most sanguine wishes and expectations, and where the vast sums of money so cheerfully paid by the nation for carrying on that war, can be as little paralleled in history, as the victories it produced? Are we then to talk of no indemnification for all that expence,——for all those vast treasures we have bestowed for five or six years past? A sum of money with which Jugurtha could have purchased the whole Roman empire in its grandeur. Are we destined for ever to fight knight-errant battles in all the quarters of the world, without any view of interest or advantage to ourselves? For my own part, I have always looked upon Machiavel, or cardinal Richlieu, as much better patterns to follow in state affairs than Don Quixote: and I shall still hope, that after so just and necessary a war, followed with so much success and honour, we shall have a suitable indemnification for the blood and treasure we have spent in doing ourselves justice. What private man in England, engaged in a law-suit, after he has obtained a decree in his favour, but asks and receives costs of suit?


I hope these wolves in sheeps cloathing will be detected, and no longer listened to, as I think it is made very plain, that when they argue for acquiring Canada, and giving up Guadaloupe, or when they talk of a disinterested peace, they have neither the interest of Britain or North-America in their view. It is plainly the interest of France they aim at, joined perhaps with some small advantages to the sugar islands we have; but from these destructive principles, how warmly do they struggle against the trade, wealth, grandeur and honour of their native country (if they are British) I hope is now made very clear to the world.

What may be in our power to keep from France at a peace, I shall not be so presuming as to determine; but I will take upon me to affirm these two things, first, that a disinterested peace, if I understand the meaning of it, not to think of our own interest, but to give up every thing; and keep no proper indemnification for our expence in so just a war, would be a peace that the nation might have reason to bestow a much harsher name upon than disinterested, and will not fail to do it. And,

Secondly, That if Canada and Guadaloupe were put in our option, to chuse the one and reject the other, no true British subject, who knew any thing of the true interest of his country, or any North-American, would hesitate a moment in making the choice of Guadaloupe, and rejecting Canada: and I know many worthy gentlemen in the sugar islands we have, who I am sure, would frankly and generously give up all selfish views of a little private gain, for such an acquisition as Guadaloupe, which they are sensible must add so much to the trade, wealth and dignity of their country.

I am, &c.

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LETTER III.

In perils amongst false Brethren.

S I R,

IN my two preceding Letters I gave you my thoughts upon the subject of Guadeloupe, with the ordinary freedom of a letter, and without studying much method or order; but sometimes answering absurd arguments, and at other times stating the case in its true light; I shall therefore go on in the same manner, and observe, that since the beginning of the last century the affairs of Europe have undergone almost a total change, in every state, less or more, in their trade, policy and government; in a great measure owing to the new discovered world of America and the West-Indies. It would be in vain for me to trace its progress, or to shew the natural causes that produced these alterations, as it could be no way decisive of the point in issue; it may be sufficient for my purpose to notice, that the trade of Great-Britain is now in a more flourishing state than ever it was, and more so than any of its neighbours.

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That three-fourths of the trade and shipping of Great-Britain at present, consists in her trade to the West-Indies and North-America; the great consumption of the manufactures and produce of Great-Britain both in the West-Indies and North-America, not only employs such a number of tradesmen in England, but also furnishes business for so many ships and seamen in carrying those things to the several markets of this new world, and bringing back to England the produce of these countries, which she does or should retail to the rest of Europe. And, Secondly, the trade betwixt America and the West-Indies in their reciprocal wants, now become very considerable. Our trade up the Straights and to the Levant, is generally allowed to be much upon the decline, and to the North, in exports especially, greatly diminished; our trade with Spain, once the great support of the nation, rather against us since the last war, when, for the interest of the house of Austria, we not only gave up Cape-Briton, but even our South-sea ship; and yet our trade more flourishing than ever, and our naval strength greater, this can only proceed from our skilful culture of the few sugar islands we have, and the fine countries of America, from their increase of people and their great demands of the produce and manufactures of the mother-country.

As England very early felt the benefits of this new world, and found greater returns, and more gain from her trade with America than any where else; so she turned her thoughts most that way, and the other branches of her trade in Europe being less attended to, came to decline, and be more diverted into other channels. What must be her state then, and to what a deplorable state must she sink, if she loses this trade to America and the West-Indies; which I am afraid will too soon be the case, if this giddiness of the people,

people, this madness that reigns after North-America; be not in some measure extinguished, or at least moderated by the prudence and judgment of so great a monarch as fills the throne, and so patriot a ministry as now conducts the reins of government. My assertion I prove thus :

That our possessions in North-America, such as we have an undoubted title to, when they are properly secured to us by treaty and a well established barrier, are rather greater than we are able to manage to any good purpose. I have already said that they are of much greater extent of territory than Great-Britain, better and more variety of climates, and even now as they stand, just emerging out of infancy, they have already more produce than they can dispose of. The sugar islands we have are not able to consume one half of the lumber, flour, biscuit, rice, and other produce of America. From which, in my former letters, I drew this plain consequence, that acquiring more sugar islands was chiefly the interest of North-America as well as Britain: now I shall show it in the following light. That as North-America, our settlements there I mean, are so fast increasing in people as to double their number once in twenty years [so say the writers for Canada,] then it surely follows, that they must abate of their application in cultivating the ground, the produce of which is to lie a dead weight upon their hands, useless and unconsumed. They must naturally put those spare people to learn arts and trades; to make cloaths, shoes, stockings, shirts, &c. smiths, carpenters, braziers, and all the trades that flourish in England: after this is accomplished, of what utility will they be of to Great-Britain? What can they want from her in all times thereafter? Thus the greatest benefits of North-America fails you at once: but this is not all, for then she will rival you in the West-Indies: America will furnish those islands with every thing that
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now comes from England, and can do it cheaper ; so that the trade and grandeur of Great-Britain soon comes to an end, when America and the West-Indies are no longer of any use to her. This fatal catastrophe, which no power on earth could bring upon her by open force, she procures to herself with her eyes open ; and by the advice of false, unnatural, and corrupted children, who can prostitute those great talents given them, of eloquence and persuasion, to the destruction, ruin, and murder of the mother who gave them birth, and to tear open those tender maternal breasts that suckled them.

O tempora ! O mores !

Whereas, if we would now embrace this sunshine of prosperity, this favourable opportunity that offers to enlarge our possessions in the West-Indies, to acquire more of the sugar islands, neutral as well as French, America might thereby be kept much longer in dependance upon Britain, by affording her more consumption for her produce, and diverting her attention from trades and manufactures, to follow agriculture, and a prudent attention to every circumstance that can secure her dependance upon Britain, to establish certain and distinct bounds and limits to the French possessions and ours in that country, to restrain the French from any property upon, or communication with the sea-coast, and to keep up a political jealousy of the French in North-America, and at the same time to avoid any real danger.

Is it possible to imagine that so extensive and so fertile a country as North-America, which we would now grasp at, can long remain dependant upon, and subject to Great-Britain, without some jealousies raised and maintained amongst themselves, both of internal and external objects upon their own continent ; in which
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the French settlements in Canada, properly limited, may become very instrumental? Thus by a prudent and timely encrease of your territory or possessions in the West-Indies, you not only double the trade and shipping of Great-Britain, but you bind America longer and firmer to her dependance upon England, by establishing a more equal balance betwixt America and the West-Indies, where we are too weak in every sense, and every knowing man's opinion.

As to this favourite scheme of colonizing, let us look backwards and see what attempts the Grecians or Romans made that way. We shall find few precedents there. The Grecians indeed settled some few small colonies on the coasts of Asia, and left them as often a shameful prey to the Persians. In modern times Spain is almost the only instance we can find to cast our eyes upon: Spain, in the beginning of the last century, was the dread of Europe: slavery and universal monarchy frightened the rest of the world: she had naval strength to cover and protect her conquests of the new world, and could spare fleets and armies sufficient to make England tremble in its boasted zenith, the reign of Elizabeth. Was not that enterprise baffled and disappointed by the winds and tempests, more than by the united fleets of her and her merchants. But behold the fatal consequences of such pernicious measures in a state. Spain grasped at conquests in a foreign country in the new world, so far above the extent and ability of the mother-country that she dispeopled herself: and though she conquered these countries, the inexhaustible fountain of those precious mettles that the world hunt after with so insatiable an appetite, yet she gradually declined from those mistaken maxims to the state she is now in.

Are we then so infatuated that we can neither take advice nor take warning? Are not we the only people upon

upon earth, except Spain, that ever thought of establishing a colony ten times more extensive than our own ; of richer soils and more variety of climates, productive of every individual thing that our country can yield, and yet fancy, when it comes to maturity, it will still depend upon us, or be of any kind of advantage to us : on the contrary, if it does not become our master, it must soon, very soon, stand our powerful rival in all the branches of our trade.

It is a maxim now established beyond dispute, that Britain cannot acquire territory upon the continent of Europe to any sort of advantage, but rather to her own detriment, as all her liberty, wealth, and happiness, are, in a great measure, owing to her being an island disengaged from the dangers and quarrels of her neighbours. I flatter myself I have in these three letters made it as plain that she cannot acquire more property upon the continent of America, without more danger ; and that she has more there already than she can manage to any profitable purpose.

It is in the sugar islands only, that she can acquire territory to her own advantage, and it is there she is most deficient ; one acre in the sugar islands is of more real advantage to her than a thousand in America. It is from these islands that the greatest part of her trade and wealth flow. As islands they are detached like herself from the rest of the world, and must always be dependent upon her, or some other such power, while time is, as they produce nothing that the mother-country does ; they must always be clothed from head to foot by the mother-country, fed from thence in the most material articles, and every house furnished from that quarter in all its wants, tables, chairs, beds, cabinets, mirrors, locks, hinges, table and bed-linens ; in short, every thing must come from home ; nor can they ever be in any other situation, as the expence of
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living, together with the warmth of the climate, renders it impossible to manufacture them there so cheap as you can bring them from England or North-America; therefore they can never subsist by themselves without you; must always remain dependent, and continue the fountain of great wealth to the mother-country.

If this be the true state of the case, as undoubtedly it is, what language, what expressions can a man use to give a lively representation to the world of that fatality of sentiment, that distraction of mind, or that corruption of heart that can endeavour so warmly to mislead their country; not only from acquiring more territory amongst such valuable islands, where she can only make acquisitions to her advantage, but even to give up what she is actually in possession of, and hunt her own ruin through the deserts of America? I confess it is above my reach if I keep within the bounds of decency, therefore I leave it to the reader's own fancy, that I may avoid the imputation of railing more than arguing.

Let us now cast our eyes upon the French trade and shipping. What a rapid progress they made from the treaty of Utrecht, the captors of their ships in this and the last war gives us some light: those who took a view of the French ports before the war was declared, were surprized at the vast number of shipping belonging to every port in the channel, and up the bay of Biscay. Were they employed in the trade to Canada or the West-Indies? The captors themselves, and every account published of them, shows that it was the West-India trade that mostly employed them. This great increase of the French trade since the peace of Utrecht, was entirely owing to the French penetration, and our fatal indolence and security from that period which would not allow us to perceive the progress

gress they made, and the sugar islands they possessed, nor never make the least attempt to enlarge our own possessions or territories there: What were the consequences? Why, in the period of British indolence, lethargy or security, France, who could not at the treaty of Utrecht supply themselves with the small quantity of sugars they consumed, now consume a great deal, and serve most of the markets of Europe to a great extent: and we, who at that period exported a good deal of sugar, could not, at the breaking out of the present war, serve ourselves with that article; and Ireland then imported about fourteen thousand hog-heads of sugar from Portugal, and other places annually, from a want of that commodity of our own.

It was in this branch the shipping trade and naval strength of France made such progress: Who then could so audaciously assert to us we had sugar islands enough already? Who but those proprietors of estates in the few sugar islands we have? If it is asserted of them, it has some foundation in truth, because as to them individually, they have enough; more would hurt the exorbitant prices they have long demanded from their country, much higher than any other market in Europe. But if it is said that we have sugar islands enough for the interest of the nation, there is no shadow of truth in it; I flatter myself I have a title to say so from what is contained in this and my former letters upon that subject; but I shall push the truth a little further from facts that cannot be concealed, from evidence as clear as the sun at noon-day.

Is there a man in Barbadoes, in Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, or all the islands around, who will not own that these islands belonging to Great-Britain are all of them cultivated to the highest pitch? that they have more hands than they can employ for want of
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territory ; that many people of late years who came over from Britain or Ireland, possibly indentured, or at a venture, and have by frugality and good behaviour in a few years acquired ten, fifteen or twenty negroes of their own, yet could not get a bit of soil to work upon or employ these hands from want of territory, and were thereby necessitated to go to Dutch, Danish, French or neutral islands, for ground to employ those hands and subsist themselves. Is it possible to think that such people could shake off the honest English prejudice in favour of their country, to neglect the English liberty and property, and go to seek subsistence where both these blessings were more precarious, if they had not been driven to it by fatal necessity, the want of territory of our own to employ them ? No man that belongs to the sugar islands we have, will be hardy enough to deny the facts, as they are so well known, though they may be concealed from the generality of the people of England, that the Danish settlements of St. Croix, and others, as well as the Dutch settlements upon the coast of South-America, where sugar makes such progress, are almost intirely peopled from ours, and by those only who could not at any rate obtain soil or possession to work upon in our own islands : nay, some of those adventurers have gone from the other islands to Jamaica itself, before they have determined to go elsewhere, and after a few years trial were sensible that all the grounds which could be cultivated with any advantage there, were done already ; unless what belonged to some over-grown estates, who choosed to let it lay as it was rather than be at the expence of culture, which might in some degree lessen the value of what was so cultivated already.

Are we then to be for ever so fatally blinded to our interest, as to necessitate our own people to go away
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and enrich all our neighbours, nay our enemies, with their superior skill in culture ; and people the richest spots of the world for others, not for ourselves ? What a fatal insensibility is this, when it is demonstratively plain, that we want nothing but some more of the sugar islands to make us great ; nay, to make us the greatest people this day upon earth ; and that it is now in our power to establish that greatness by one easy acquisition of more territory there. The riches of those sugar islands beyond any places we have or know, is fully demonstrated at London itself, where so many gentlemen can, from no great extent of territory in those islands, live at London in splendour, and rival the nobility in equipage and expence. I am far from repining at it, I am glad to see it, and wish to have more of those islands, and many more such people at London. It is they only that would confine our possessions there, and limit the number, that they may shine the brighter themselves ; but it most plainly demonstrates to the world the value of those islands, and convince you that we cannot have too many of them.

I was myself an eye-witness of that fatality of my country I complain of, when the accounts came to London of the capitulation of Guadaloupe. How was it received ? Rather like a misfortune than a blessing, as a fruitless and mistaken expedition ; not so much as the huzzas of a mob, but one universal ridicule of the terms of the capitulation in every coffee-house, to divert their attention from the importance of the thing ; they were prepared for this from the time it was known that the fleet and army had left Martinico, and the troops landed in the larger and richer island of Guadaloupe. I decline dwelling any longer upon so disagreeable a subject, as to run over all the insensibility, and infatuation I was witness of ; I shall only say, in this manner was received the accounts

counts of a conquest the greatest and most important England ever made since the reduction of Ireland; of a great deal more consequence than any thing they acquired by all her bloody and expensive wars at the end of the last century, and the first twelve years of this; how discouraging then must it have been to such a ministry as we are blest with, when they had shewn so distinguished a sense of the interest of their country; so firm a resolution to establish her superiority over France upon the most solid and national footing, to find it spurned at, and their country blinded to her interest? Might not this be one reason, amongst many others, that so fatal a blow to the wealth, trade, and naval strength of France, was no further pushed?

I shall turn too warm if I continue this subject any longer, therefore I proceed to mention one argument used by the more moderate for relinquishing Guadaloupe, and it is thus; That we may depend upon its being given up to France, because the merchants of England, who are the best judges of its national interest, have shewn no anxiety about Guadaloupe, or expressed any inclination to have it kept. To which I answer, First, that I cannot admit it, nay, I could venture to put the whole fate of it upon the opinions of the merchants, that the acquiring more territory in the sugar islands would increase the wealth, trade, and shipping of Great-Britain more than any thing else. I will not say I would risque it upon the opinions of those that are proprietors of our sugar islands singly, though the thing is so self-evident, that I believe I might do it with safety. But, Secondly, I can by no means admit that the merchants are the best judges of national measures, I shall not say they are just the worst, but sure I am they are far from being the best; nor can it be otherwise; a merchant's business, as such, is to watch the present times, and improve every

circumstance to his own gain: his thoughts, study, and reflections, as a merchant, are confined to a few years, the short period he exists in, very rarely to look above three years backwards or forwards; from good intelligence to know when to purchase and when to sell stocks; if a war is likely to happen in the north to sell stocks, which must fall, and purchase iron and naval stores, which must rise in their prices; to discern when French cloaths, hats, and other stuffs, from the fatality of war, can be purchased at very low prices, and vended for our own with very high profits. Even this favourite continent of America, the merchants there can easily discover, that their lumber, their wheat, biscuit, rice, and salt-fish, can give a much better price in the French islands than in ours; that the French sugars and molasses, from the dangers of navigation, sells at so low rates, that they carry most of their lumber and provisions to St. Domingo, and carry the French sugars and molasses to America, with much more profit than they can do from our islands; not only what serves themselves, but so as to import more sugars to England than any island she has can afford, besides what sugars America sends of late years to Holland and up the Straights without ever coming to England at all. If rightly informed, I may appeal to the custom-houses in England for the truth of the importation of sugars from North-America; and the custom-houses of our own sugar islands can shew how little there was or has been shipped for America a year or two past. I have no business to dip deeper into those affairs at present, further than this; that it is a strong demonstration how quickly this favourite people of North-America can think of shifting for themselves, independent of Britain. But to return to the merchants, their heads and thoughts are entirely fixed upon the present times, where and how to make the greatest gain to themselves, in which some can take more liberties than others.

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But how widely different is this from those who are formed to conduct the helm of state, those who must study the philosophy and policy of government, which teaches them to look back as far as authentic histories can conduct them with certainty, to mark the causes of the rise and decline of antient states, to study the passions and designs of the great men of those times, which were productive of such events; to compare the passions and operations of the human mind in the present times, with those that are past; to carry on those observations to future times, to mark where the state may be ship-wrecked, and avoid those dangers; to observe what may aggrandize her in future times, and take measures to secure that, before her coteremporaries or enemies can discover the danger, or prevent the effect.

When these two, the merchant and the minister, are thus briefly compared, how widely different are they; in reality as wide almost as east from west; let us not deceive ourselves then in these notions, that the merchants are, or can be, the best judges of the philosophy of government, or the interest of a state, nor let us be so unjust to them as to interpret their modest silence to a proof of their condemning measures so much for the interest of the nation in general, which they cannot but approve of. On the contrary, let us more justly think that their silence proceeds from that full confidence they have, and all of us ought to maintain, in the capacity and integrity of those ministers who conduct the wheels of government, that they can judge the interest of the nation and follow it more steadily than we can direct, or even wish. I esteem the merchants as the most useful body of people in the nation; at the same time I am very happy to think that we have much better and abler pilots to conduct the state.

I shall, in the last place, take notice of another motive often mentioned with more appearance of judgment, and it is thus; That possibly all our conquests must be restored to France: it depends intirely upon the fate of the war in Germany, the fates of Hanover, and the king of Prussia. This favours a good deal more of modesty, and in some measure may be true, but not universally so. As it appears a little dark, let us bring it to the light and examine it. We are surely under the strongest ties to protect Hanover that can possibly occur. It is the hereditary dominions of so good a king, attacked only in our quarrel, they have made a noble stand against the power of France for three years past, and acquired great honour to themselves as well as to the prince that conducted them. But they have been as powerfully supported by us as any people could be, with money, provisions, forage, artillery, and British auxiliaries: and, blessed be God, France has made no impression as yet; the cause of liberty prospers there. If all the power of France could not penetrate into Hanover these three campaigns past, have we any reason to dread she can do it next year, when her strength is declined, and our capacity of supporting Hanover become greater? Will France have plate to coin every year? Do not let us betray too visibly those dastardly sentiments that have no real foundation: that argument can only be used by those who wish it were so.

And as for the king of Prussia, I have as great esteem for him as any man should have: he has made the most glorious stand against the united force of the greatest empires we know for four years past, as must make him the theme of future ages, as well as the present. His magnanimity, joined with such quickness in judging, and such rapidity in executing, affords resources in himself that cannot be so obvious
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to less exalted minds: his victories have always been obtained with far inferior numbers: the bravery and discipline of his troops no way abated, and the greatness of his own mind remains unshaken: why then may not the same causes, under the direction of the same Providence, produce the same effects, while we supply him with the same power of money?

Nevertheless, to view where the argument points against us, give me leave to suppose that the empires of Germany and Russia should get the advantage of him, which heaven avert. These two powers have long carried on a war against that great prince, from causes neither founded in reason, interest, or policy, but from the most unruly passions: though the motives may be low, yet they must be more head-strong and irresistible than when they are governed by reason or interest. Can we then suppose that the queen of Hungary, after she has gained so favourite a point, will all at once abandon these passions that were too strong to be controuled by her honour and her interest both? Will our aggrandising France be a stronger motive to her than her own interest was? on the contrary, this seeming union betwixt the houses of Bourbon and Austria, must appear to the rest of the world as a temporary phrenzy, or an alliance betwixt a fox and a lamb. Her memory must still suggest to her, that France was always the hereditary foe of her family, and must continue so; therefore our aggrandising France must be observed by her with a jealous eye and unsatisfied mind: and can never be a motive for her to restore the king of Prussia, whose ruin she has pursued, almost to her own destruction, in opposition to her interest and honour. Or can we surmise to ourselves that Russia will be moved to correct those head-strong passions, and to restore the king of Prussia

sia from our aggrandising France, on whom she has no visible dependance. For my part, I own this argument drawn from the situation of Germany or the king of Prussia, seems both dark and unconvulsive to me: I make no sort of doubt but France will join with you at any time you please to ruin the house of Austria, and see you with pleasure waste as much blood and treasure for that purpose as you have done in former times to save her.

But if Britain looks upon herself as set apart to be the guardian of the liberties of Europe, she must at the same time look upon France as the vulture lying always in wait to devour them: let her act then with that steadiness and magnanimity becoming so great a people; let her consider, that while she retains the superiority over France, now put in her hands, the liberties of Europe are secured; a few members may suffer some temporary inconveniencies, but they may be comforted that the duration is short, and their deliverance at hand, while Britain holds the reigns. How will all the states of Germany in their turns bless that steadiness in the councils of Great-Britain, that could not be diverted from maintaining and establishing her superiority over France; the only thing that can in all times to come afford certain relief to the oppressed. Whereas, if she is tempted or betrayed to give up this long wished-for superiority (that is now visibly in her hands) for any motives whatever, or any temporary conveniencies to Germany; her own liberties, as well as those of Germany, must ever after be precarious and uncertain; because Britain had not firmness to hold fast that balance so clearly put in her hands. Let her now act with steadiness becoming herself, and think for her own good, for the good of Germany, as well as the rest of the world: almost every state in Europe is deeply interested in her resolutions upon this

this great and important event ; but if Britain should stand doubting and trembling to betray and give up the liberties of Europe at once, by restoring the naval strength and wealth of France, centered in the sugar islands, for any momentary or imaginary distresses whatever, how unlike would it be, to that magnanimity and fortitude of the Roman people we so much affect to imitate and equal ; who could both project and execute the ruin and destruction of Carthage itself, while Hannibal was yet thundering so nigh the gates of Rome ?

But I am afraid I have said too much, and wandered out of my depth from honest motives more than from inadvertency ; therefore I shall now conclude with resuming what I think is proved, that the acquiring more territory in Europe, or the continent of America, must certainly be fatal to us : that the West-Indies is the only place we can acquire territory in, to any sort of advantage : that it is in our power to do it easily at this juncture : that such acquisitions in the West-Indies must raise our wealth and naval strength above France, or any power on earth, and much above what it is.

We see ourselves blessed with a great monarch and an able ministry, with a brave army and invincible fleets ; that victory has already put in our hands a curb to check the power of France, and maintain the liberties of Europe : I hope we shall not throw it away tamely or with timidity. For though some false brethren, some unnatural children, have arisen amongst us, endeavouring to blast this fair harvest, and mislead us into error and ruin : yet I hope their artifices are too thin to darken our eyes, and the measures of our ministry too steady to be shaken or misled. If our debt should be augmenting, so is our trade and wealth increasing with more rapidity ;

pidity ; our abilities to carry on the war rising daily, while that of our common enemy sinks visibly to all the world, below even the power of defending any of her colonies.—Where can we hesitate ?


Basseterre,
October 26, 1760.

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LETTER IV.

S I R,

IT appears to me, that any people or nation must be happy in themselves, and respectable to their neighbours, in proportion to their numbers and the industry they are employed in. It is industry that is real wealth, and the abounding with the necessaries of life makes the people happy at home, while they enjoy the liberty and security of possessing what their industry produces. Industry can never be universal in any country where liberty and property are not well secured and protected, as no man will be industrious where he is not sure of enjoying the fruits and profits of that industry and labour; so that liberty and industry are close companions, and generally go hand in hand; industry then is real wealth, not gold and silver, which are only the shadows or representations of wealth and industry. Gold and silver can never be retained in any country after industry is gone, no more than you can retain the shadow after the substance is removed. Agriculture

culture at first spreads or diffuses industry more universally over a country than any thing else can do; the more that country improves in the knowledge and practice of agriculture, the necessaries of life must become the cheaper, and the more materials afforded for trades and manufactures, the more these last abound the greater demand you have for shipping and commerce to carry such productions round the rest of the world, and barter them for the other things you want to carry home, or vend to other countries.

Thus you raise a new body of manufacturers, and a new body of sailors and merchants; it is from those the wealth, strength, and grandeur of a nation arises, more than from such as follow the plough, though the last are the first springs from which the others are moved. If a nation have neither trades, manufactures, shipping, nor commerce, it can never be formidable to its neighbours, though that nation should understand both the theory and practice of agriculture and vegetation better than any people upon earth yet does; the manufactures, shipping, and commerce of a nation, are its real wealth, and what gives it most weight among all its neighbours; if that shipping and commerce is founded and subsists principally upon the productions of that country, then it stands upon the most solid foundation, but if it depends entirely upon other nations, or being the carriers for other people, it is then more precarious, and can last only until those states become wise enough, or populous enough to be their own carriers.

It follows surely from these principles, that a nation can never be too attentive to agriculture, either in the infancy or maturity of that nation, because
from

from it arises plenty of the necessaries of life at home; to maintain numbers of people industriously employed in trades and manufactures, while those afford business for the third set merchants and sailors, which compleats both the internal and external strength of a state; that the legislative power can never be too attentive in promoting such industry, and directing it to its proper objects by well adjusted laws and regulations for that purpose; nor can the executive power be too circumspect in putting these laws and regulations in execution, with the utmost care, candour, and impartiality. Who then can agree with the author of a late pamphlet, intitled, "The Interest of Great-Britain considered," when he asserts that trades and manufactures, with commerce the natural consequence of the two, are the poverty of a country? Whether he means that they arise from the poverty of a country, or that they are themselves the poverty of that country, the assertion is equally erroneous; for I have shewn before that they must arise from plenty of rivers, and plenty of people industriously employed, and secured from tyranny, which are the real and natural springs of the strength and wealth of any state, the seeds from which manufactures and commerce spring, and therefore they are the greatest wealth and strength of a nation.

It may appear surprising that a man of eloquence, learning, and education, should allow himself to deviate into such absurdities as assert, that trades, manufactures, and commerce, either arise from poverty, or are themselves the poverty of a state.

When he thinks so, it is natural enough to attempt the persuading of us to give up those valuable sugar islands

islands that consume so much of our manufactures, and employ so much of our shipping, I cannot say he is inconsistent with himself, as he so often asserts of the author of the Remarks. But I may venture to affirm, that he is in this very inconsistent with common sense, and the common maxims of policy and government of this and the preceding ages of the world. I shall leave this singular author for a little, and make a few general observations upon the practice of establishing foreign colonies.

It is generally allowed at all hands, and asserted by this author himself, that Great-Britain, properly cultivated, might maintain more than double the number of people it contains at present: it has been also the opinion of many great men, that the same number of people contracted into one half of the bounds of Great-Britain might be happier and more formidable than they are at present, as there would be a quicker intercourse amongst all its parts, and their united force more easily and quickly exerted; as this may seem a strong argument against colonizing in any shape, I shall take no share in it, being more inclined to think that colonies when they are established from the principles of reason, good policy, and experience, may be very beneficial to a state, and contribute much to her wealth, dignity, and influence over other nations.

To settle colonies in new countries, appears to be no more than creating of a new people to trade with the mother-country, under all the disadvantages to them, and all the advantages to herself that she pleases to impose upon this new child or vassal. It would naturally occur to any man, that the more frugal you are in exporting of your own people to this new colony so much the better, provided

vided the end be obtained, a few of the most use-
less of those at home, with the addition of foreign-
ers, will multiply faster in a new country than any
where else; but then the colony ought to be at a
proper distance for the encouragement of navigation
and sailors, it ought to be also in the most diffe-
rent climates and soils from the mother-country,
that its demands may be the greater, and its capa-
city of rivalling herein any of her productions be-
come the less; that the colony produce principally
those things which the mother-country cannot,
whereby navigation is increased; but above all, that
the colonies be proportioned in some sense to the
mother-country, that the head may be able to ma-
nage all its members, and not the members too
powerful for the head.

If this mother-country should be an island, and
sensible that the greatest share of the blessings she
enjoys are owing to her being an island, disen-
gaged from the quarrels of the continent, then
any colonies she could establish upon any large
continent, might have this disadvantage of robbing
her in a great measure of her natural and happy
state of being an island, and engaging her in con-
tinental quarrels, if the colonies she were to esta-
blish in this continent were ten times larger than
the mother-country, in the same climates, richer
soils, and productive of every individual thing the
mother-country can yield, reason and experience
would both call aloud, that it was destructive; that
it was madness and folly, unless the principal view
were to transfer the mother-country there, to make
the new colonies the mistress of the world, and the
poor old mother made her slave.

But if this mother-country, supposed to be an
island, had in her offer islands in plenty for to settle
colonies,

colonies, small islands would reasonably appear to be the most useful colonies, they could be protected by her fleets, would engage her in no continental wars, are, like herself, detached from the rest of the world; if these islands were at proper distances for the encouragement of shipping and sailors, were situate in climates so opposite that they could produce nothing which the mother-country does; that they must be fed and clothed from the mother-country, and supplied in every thing from thence; that from their climate they must ever be dependant, and yet produce the most useful articles of luxury to the rest of the world, which never can grow in the mother-country; that some of those productions were both bulky and valuable, and should require the more shipping, such as sugars, cotton, &c. that experience had taught and demonstrated to her the value of such islands, and that every state which was wise enough to establish colonies in those islands grew wealthy at home, and potent at sea, in proportion to the territory they possessed there; surely in that case there could be no room for hesitating, every sound head and honest heart would call aloud for these island-colonies preferable to any thing else.

The application is exceeding obvious to Great-Britain as an island, with her colonies upon the continent of America, and the islands in the West-Indies. If those prudent and political maxims in establishing colonies, were just, solid, and true some years ago, or even a hundred years ago, as undoubtedly they were mostly so, why are they not true now? What changes has happened in the nature of things? What revolutions or convulsions has the world undergone of late, to justify reason and folly, wisdom and madness into their opposite stations?

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The pamphlet I have mentioned, viz. The Interest of Great-Britain considered, is a very singular one, to answer it fully would be too tedious for you to read or me to write, I shall however glance at its maxims and conclusions in general as briefly as I can, not having the time to bestow upon it that it merits.

The general plan of it is, that all North-America in our possession must make us the greatest people in the world, no people to controul the growth of our colonies, they will extend so far, and multiply so fast, that at present they double their number in less than twenty years, under all the disadvantages of turbulent neighbours, and murderings, and scalpings, and will therefore increase much faster when Canada is added; the trade we shall enjoy from such a large and wealthy country is painted out fully; its inviting soils, its rivers and lakes for navigation, the flax, hemp, silk, wool, and naval stores it can send home, and all these golden prospects are set off to such advantage, as puts me in mind of a simile in an old English love-song, where the honest sincerity and fondness of a young unpractised swain in the hands of a gilded or painted beauty, well trained in female arts, is represented as follows:

Thus in the sun be-dropt with gold
The basking adder lies,
The swain admires each shining fold,
Then grasps a snake and dies.

I hope we shall be wiser than grasp this gilded snake and be bit to death: will people consider that those shining advantages North-America has beyond any other country we know, is the very thing that creates our danger; what ought to put us most upon our guard, he says, they double their numbers in less

than twenty years. Now let us suppose that the inhabitants of our own colonies and all Canada, old and young, male and female, were just one million, twenty years hence they are two millions, in forty years four millions, in sixty years eight millions, in eighty years sixteen millions, in a hundred years, just one century, thirty-two millions; now will all those people look on idle in every thing but hoeing the ground, as we make the negroes do here in Guadaloupe, while they have the same liberty you have in England, while you see every week in your newspapers advertisements of high premiums offered to the skilful in every individual trade in England, to indenture for a term of years; to some part of North-America, and going off in every ship, this does not drain us of any useful people, he says, nor will it ever propagate any of those trades or manufactures in America, though they have many more hands to employ, and cheaper living: can any reasonable man give ear to such absurd notions?

On the contrary, every sensible man I have seen, who has made any halt in North-America assures me, that the woollen manufactures in particular have come a good length there; that every other trade advances gradually; that the hats of North-America are much finer than in England, and when one or two are brought over to England they give near double the price of the best of their own; those that have come from Canada affirm, that the French woollen manufactures there are very considerable; can any man fancy that the world will take his single assertion in opposition to these well-known facts, founded upon the best authorities? Manufactures cannot come to perfection in a year, they advance in proportion as the state increases in people. Was it not the opinions of all those that wrote upon these subjects before the war, that America might prove of fatal consequence

to us, if our possessions in the West-Indies were not also enlarged, that the West-Indies produced all the wealth, and America only a part of the cause? The learned and ingenious Mr. Postlethwayt in his Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, the first volume, published *anno* 1751, and compiled at least some years before, when the controversy betwixt America and the West-Indies did not exist with that warmth it does now, shews many of those dangers from North-America, and the sense the French had of the value of those sugar islands, and our lameness or inattention there, the dangerous practices of the North-Americans against Great-Britain are too well known already, and during this war they trade with all the French, Spanish, Dutch and Danish settlements, to the great detriment of the trade of Great-Britain.

But since this cannot open our eyes, will they not very soon go greater lengths as they increase in people? This learned author does not see any danger from North-America for some centuries, but I think it is shewn before, that one century makes them thirty-two millions of people, about four times the number in Great-Britain, then every body will agree they may be dangerous; but granting him for once that it may be three centuries, what a schemer is this for the grandeur, establishment, and duration of a state, which he calculates to come to an end in two or three centuries; lays imaginary schemes for its grandeur and wealth a few years, but sure and certain measures for its destruction and ruin in two or three centuries, and that destruction too the works of its own hands. These are very new and very refined notions of government surely; what would have been our state now had our predecessors schemed as solidly for us?

Let us then despise his gilded pills of destruction, and follow more solid measures; let us hold fast by those valuable sugar islands from whence the wealth and naval strength of France has sprung and subsisted, those islands that can never endanger our liberty, or ruin our trade, but must always remain dependant, and continue the fruitful source of our wealth and naval power. In that case our wealth and grandeur may subsist and endure as long as the instability of human affairs can permit any state to flourish.

He dwells much upon the expence of a war in America, and the great merit of preventing the like expence for the future, he sees surely what every other man sees, that the French have ruined their country more than ever they did at any time in so short a period by their ill-judged war in America, where the advantages of circumstance must always be on our side, as such war is carried on mostly by sea, and that we are much stronger on the continent of America than they, and more powerful at sea; so that by attempting to support the war in America, and their schemes in that country from Old France by sea, their marine strength was weakened and lost, their trade followed, and their wealth from the West-Indies being stop'd, bankruptcy ensued. Is it for these reasons he repines so much at the expence of the war in America, because it has sunk the power, ambition, and naval strength of France? These authors have told us France will never be at peace with us, therefore we must exclude them from North-America, the place in the world where we must have the greatest advantages over them in war, and which the present times have fully demonstrated. Pray, whether is it the interest of France, or the interest of England, he has at heart?

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The French, he tells us, will easily part with it: this we absolutely agree in. I believe they will, as they see it has nigh ruined them, they will easily part with what has been destructive, for those sugar islands which had raised their wealth and naval strength to such a pitch as it had arrived at before the war, they will easily part with it, because they see how it can be productive of the ruin of Great-Britain in a very short period, more clearly than I have described in those brief letters. But are these the solidest reasons for us to act by? What is the interest of France can never be the interest of Britain too; for us to follow the tracks pointed out to us by France, I am afraid would prove the certain paths of destruction.

This author I am now glancing at has given us at the end an abstract of the exports from England to North-America, and the West-Indies comparatively, and at different periods, to prove to us the great value of North-America above the West-Indies, but I think it has a very contrary effect if rightly considered; the first period is from the year 1744 to 1748, a period of war, when the troops and fleets sent to North-America far exceeded those sent to the West-Indies; and yet the exports to the small spots we have in the West-Indies was as great as the exports to all the extensive and populous colonies of North-America to a trifle. The next period is from 1754 to 1758, a time that we have such vast armies and fleets in that quarter of the world, and when all the colonies are in arms, they must have more demands from England than when they are industriously cultivating the ground, and following their trades and manufactures.—In this period America rises far above the West-Indies, but when these armies and fleets are withdrawn, America will return to what it was.

Is it not from this very plain that the acquiring more of the sugar islands would make the exports to these islands double what it is to America, and double the trade from the West-Indies to America at the same time ; and yet all those islands far from the extent of territory that one of those American provinces contains, with this difference, that those islands will increase in their demands from the mother-country, and for ever remain dependant ; but those of America can only have demands from the mother-country while in their infancy, for when they rise to maturity they must rival Britain in all her manufactures, as they will have wool, cotton, flax, hemp, raw-silk, and iron, cheaper than in England, and more hands to employ. The easy carriage of these materials by lakes and rivers from the internal parts of the country to the sea-ports, so as they may be shipped for England and manufactured there, our author has made very plain and easy ; but the same conveniency arises to themselves for carrying those materials round all their manufacturing towns and villages where they can use them, unless where you keep troops to take these things from them by force, and burn their looms : to prevent which inconveniency to this favourite country, our author has surely hit the most effectual method, and indeed it is the master-piece of the book, *viz.* “ To keep no troops there, but
 “ put arms in the hands of the people ; let them
 “ raise troops and forts as they think proper.”

He seems fully sensible how popular the cry is of saving expence, and how easy it is swallowed without any examination at all. When we are possessed of all North-America, says he, “ We shall
 “ have no expence in maintaining garrisons there,
 “ some few, however, may be necessary to secure
 “ the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce
 “ in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any
 “ tribe

" tribe of the Indians ; but these forts will be best
 " under the care of the colonies themselves, and gar-
 " risoned by their provincial forces at their own ex-
 " pence ; their own interest will induce the American
 " colonies to take care of such forts, and see the
 " officers do their duty and keep their corps full, &c."
 I shall copy no more of it, but refer you to the 13th
 and 14th pages of the book.

Now his budget is opened, least America should not
 be able to throw off her dependance upon Britain early
 enough : giving them the power of raising troops and
 training them at their own option, without any con-
 trol or dependance upon Britain, will certainly do
 the business, will accomplish the end proposed most
 effectually ; if we should keep any troops there and
 garrison these forts, he shews you in the 14th page it
 would be to no purpose, the British are so corrupt, abo-
 minable rascals, that they would be only military monks,
 and exist no where but in a muster-roll on paper.
 This aspersion upon our country and army, at a juncture
 when all the world admires them, one cannot
 read without the greatest resentment, as well as be
 alarmed at the audaciousness of the proposal, under all
 the disguise it is introduced.

It is but very lately that the British had arms put in
 their own hands, every man amongst you remembers
 that the military bill was thrown out, by a great ma-
 jority in the house of lords, May, 1756, after full de-
 bate, and at a juncture when we were so threatened
 with an invasion from France, that we necessarily
 brought over, 14,000 foreign troops to support us
 against such invasion ; who knows, but after we are
 enervated by a few years peace, that bill may be again
 thrown out, and England remain disarmed, while her
 extensive colonies in North-America enjoy the privi-
 lege of raising what armies they please independant of
 us,

us, these garrisons, he says, must be at such a distance up the country, as we in England could not know if they existed any where but in a muster-roll; we can far less know with any certainty what number of troops the colonies may chuse to keep there, which must ever be a secret from us, until they chuse to shew them in their military capacity: if those North-Americans shall in one century be above thirty millions of people, as we have shewn from this author, with well-trained armies of their own; will they stand waiting till we send them cloathing from England, or will they make for themselves, where they have better materials and cheaper work? What manufacture, or what branch of trade, are they not capable of taking from us?

Now if Canada was to be kept, the necessity of having more sugar islands comes with double force upon us, because the disproportion complained of betwixt our possessions in North-America, and those of the West-Indies, becomes thereby much greater in place of being remedied: our author shews us how fast these countries will multiply in people, by the accession of Canada. The few sugar islands we have, exclusive of Guadaloupe, are not able to serve the consumption of Great-Britain and Ireland by 10,000 hogsheads a year. America must consume as much as Britain, they must have it, particularly rum, they cannot subsist without it. Since its plain we cannot supply them, they must take these things, rum, sugar and molasses, from the French; they have shewn us even in the present war, a war entirely upon their own account, that they chuse to trade with the French sugar islands, rather than with ours, and necessity must compel them more, if Canada should be retained by us, without the sugar islands at the same time be acquired. The French sugar islands of St. Domingo, Guadaloupe, Mary Gallante, Martinico, the Granada's, Dominico and St. Lucia, in which two last they

they have governors at this hour, must all of them double their value, by the great consumption from America. I have already shewn that the great increase of the wealth and naval strength of France, arose from those sugar islands; now it must be doubled in place of being weakened by this war, and Canada in the possession of the British, become more instrumental and productive of the grandeur, shipping, and wealth of France, than it could possibly have been while in the possession of the French themselves, unless we acquire the sugar islands at the same time; those French sugar islands will take nothing from those Americans but money while they have it, masts, &c. for shipping, hemp, iron, and naval stores, or furs and wool, all to send home to France. In a word, every scheme in this treatise of the interest of Great-Britain considered, whatever way you take it, has a direct tendency to the aggrandizing of France, and ruining of Great-Britain: a short view of his maxims follows.

He says, page 23, and many other places, that our people in America increase so fast as to double their number in less than 20 years, and by adding Canada they will encrease much faster. Page 37, "That Pensilvania doubles its inhabitants every 16 years," he tells us, at the head of the 17th page, that, "The bulk of the inhabitants of North-America are landed owners, whose lands are inferior to those of Great-Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people." It has been shewn, that in one century they exceed 30 millions, fourtimes the number in Britain, then their lands are better than ours; at the end of the same 17th page, he says, "Unprejudiced men well know that all the penal and prohibitory laws that ever were thought on, will not be sufficient to prevent manufactures, in a country whose inhabitants surpass the number that can subsist by the husbandry of it:" upwards of 30 millions of people can never subsist upon agriculture

ture only, if they have not more consumption for their produce, than the few sugar islands we have can afford them, therefore manufactures must be well advanced, before they have encreased to 30 millions before one century, (as in fact they are tolerably advanced already) add to this the scheme of putting arms in their hands, page 13, to raise what forts they please, and maintain as many regular troops as they think proper, independant of Britain, and then you have a clear, short view, of the scheme he would persuade you into, and what he aims at.

He does not seem in any part of his long treatise to disown what I all along advance, that Canada joined to what we have in America will prove our destruction, but he only shifts it off to a greater distance, it must take some centuries, he says; now I think from his maxims as well as mine, it cannot be above the distance of a century, if so much, nay, if he is as young as his schemes are new and unsolid, he may possibly live to feel the completion of them himself. If those separate states or colonies in North-America should never unite, as he has been at great pains to prove they never can, (without making many converts I believe) our danger is much the same; for if in separate states, they should ruin our trades, manufactures and commerce, so as we have no vent for any thing in America or the West-Indies, where stand we? France is both at hand, and united to do the rest of the business chearfully, effectually, and, I believe, might prove rather the worst masters of the two. I think I need say no more to discredit this political guide and his schemes.

Give me only leave to suppose that the French, a most political people, and who generally gain as much in the negotiating a peace, as they lose during the war, sensible of the liberty of the press in England, should procure hirelings to publish their schemes to the people

of

of Briton, and take every popular handle to delude them into error, in what manner would such French missionaries attack us, but by gilding North-America with poetical fiction; to inflame the popular, but false ambition of extent of territory, so often prejudicial, in the annals of history, that as we have found some considerable advantages, from those colonies in their infancy, we may fancy those advantages will still rise with the colonies themselves, without perceiving the certain ruin that follows to our trade and manufactures from such growth of so extensive colonies in the same, and finer climates; that while we are giddy with success, if we could be so dazzled with those gilded phantoms of ambition as turn our eyes from the sugar islands, and leave France in possession of those treasures, she would again raise her wealth and marine force, from that quarter, with more rapidity than ever; while we were working our own destruction in America, without any expences to them. That in this scheme, the proprietors of the sugar islands we have, might probably be drawn in, to co-operate from the danger of lessening the value of their possessions in the West-Indies; by any more acquisitions there, without duly attending to future consequences, as immediate advantages often blind mens eyes to more remote dangers: that if so great a body of opulent and wealthy people, could be gained or deceived, their influence would be very considerable in the councils of Great-Britain. That if we could be yet further deluded (by the plausible pretext of saving expence) to keep no troops in America, but leave the colonies the power of what troops and forts they please to raise for their own security, the business would soon be accomplished; the seeds of our destruction being once planted and sprung in so fertile a soil, would soon ripen.

Could the French policy and ingenuity lay any scheme in their present situation more subtle, and, at the

the same time more effectual for our ruin, though it may be slow in its operations, yet it becomes the more certain in its effect, and thus all our fame and victories by sea and land turn to our own ruin, for want of that steadiness in using success, that we shewed in obtaining it; we shall then stand like Hector shining in the arms of Achilles,

A blaze of glory ere we fade away.

But I hope for better things while it is yet in our power to make the choice, that we shall follow the sure and certain paths to prosperity, and leave the dangerous and dubious flights of ambition after extent of territory, often if not always destructive.

If our own patriots should then approach us with their advice and counsel, in the same manner and strain that a French hireling missionary would do for our ruin, ought we not to take the alarm, and sift those counsels and maxims to the bottom, before we adopt them for our guides, maxims, and schemes, as new as they are dangerous; and supported by arguments as airy and imaginary, as the schemes are unsolid and destructive?

I have already taken one simile from an old English ballad, and find myself now strongly inclined to give you another; as I write only from memory, I cannot direct you where to find it, but it runs thus:

So to fulfil their prince's ends,
Some mission'd devils from hell ascends;
Their budgets with corruptions cramm'd,
The contributions of the damn'd,
Which with unsparing hands they strow,
Round all the people as they goe:
And then at Belzebub's black hall,
Complain their budgets were too small.

I hope the present French missionaries shall soon have the same reason to complain, that their budgets were too small; that Great-Britain could not be dazzled with all their gilded prospects of America. They had penetration to discover the treachery and ruin that lurks in the bowels of this Trojan horse; that they were fixt and determined to maintain their superiority over France, in their own proper marine element; to crush the wealth and naval strength of France, so essentially centered and rooted in those sugar islands; to leave the false and destructive ambition of extent of territory, to the more deluded part of the world with whom it may better agree; that they are fixt to the point of maintaining the liberties of Europe, from the restless ambition of France; to defend and protect the protestant religion every where; and to prevent the faggots of an inquisition from ever blazing in Middlesex; yet, at the same time, most benignly disposed, to protect all her Roman catholic subjects of her old, as well as new dominions, in the full and free exercise of their religion, and to bless them with all the protection, liberty and freedom, that their religion will suffer them to enjoy.


I thought I had done, but these last lines have suggested something, which justice calls on me to explain: I am told it has been industriously spread in England, that the French inhabitants of this island, are dissatisfied, turbulent, mutinous, and regardless of the terms of capitulation, than which nothing can be more false; on the contrary, they appear to be as well satisfied with their circumstances, with the liberties they enjoy both civil and religious, with the government they are under, the trade and advantages they possess, as any people on earth can be, under the uncertain state they are in, dubious to what power they may belong; that they have maintained and adhered to the articles of capitulation in every circumstance, with

a steadiness and integrity which must do honour to themselves, and to any state they may belong to; if there has been any deviation at all, I can venture to say it has been among the lowest dregs of the people, with whom I have no intercourse, and possibly may never be rightly informed of what passes there; I can also affirm, that there is less unfair trade carried on here now at this juncture, and for some months past, than in any other part of the king's dominions.

I am, &c.



L E T.



L E T T E R V.

S I R,

Y O U seem to insinuate in your letter that some people in London think I write partially in favour of Guadaloupe, I am very well pleased to know the sentiments of every man upon that subject, but might not I have some reason to say they judge partially against that place without knowing any thing about it, that they are so far prejudiced against it as not to allow themselves to take any just information upon the subject; people unprejudiced are fond of being rightly informed, but the prejudiced are hurt and vexed with every truth which gives a blow to their prejudices; for it is the value of Guadaloupe, not its insignificancy, that has raised such opposition to it; the value, wealth and produce of Guadaloupe is dreaded by the rest of our islands as a rival to their private fortunes in the other islands, and they are a powerful party in England.

But the more the other islands struggle against it, the more reason we have to keep it, because their private apprehensions can only proceed from the great

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quantity of sugar, rum, cotton, coffee, &c. that it can produce more than the other islands we have can do. If it was a thing of insignificancy they would entertain no apprehensions about it. I am very sensible what contemptible notions they had of Guadaloupe when I left England, and what pains was taken by some people to nourish those prejudices, and blind the eyes of the nation from discovering its value. Therefore I have been at the more pains to discover the truth to my country, and to represent things to them as they really are. I make no doubt such truths may surprize people at first, as they are so different from what they were taught with so much pains to believe.

I affirm that Guadaloupe, including Grand-terre, which we always look upon as one island, being only divided by a small canal of salt-water, is of much larger extent than Martinico, and productive of more sugar; that there is as much good land, free of mountains in Guadaloupe, as the whole extent of Martinico, mountains and all included. That Marie-Gallante is very near the extent of Antigua to a trifle, without a single mountain in it; there is very few sugar plantations in Marie-Gallante as yet, but it is very capable of producing sugar, and at present yields the best coffee and cotton of any of our islands, nor would it be believed that this island has sent home many millions of pounds of coffee and cotton to Britain since it was in our possession, a fact that can be proved and ascertained in England without coming here for proofs, which, it seems from prejudices at home, are disregarded.

I also affirm that this island could, in a few years, serve all Britain and Ireland with cinnamon, much cheaper than the Dutch do at present; and very soon after a sufficiency to export to other countries,
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Are these things of no consequence to Britain? Does she chuse rather to be supplied with these expensive articles of sugar and cinnamon from the French and their Dutch friends, than to have them of her own? Sure the whole system of British policy and interest must be totally changed since I left England, if this be esteemed partiality. I have also asserted, that Guadeloupe and its dependencies, in a few years after being annexed to Britain, will yield 150,000 hogheads of sugar annually. I adhere to that still, and when I say so, I am within the bounds of truth. The people here from Antigua and other islands, who are esteemed the best judges of such productions, are mostly of opinion that I might have asserted a good deal more, and though I do not differ much from them in opinion, I choosed not to go to the highest estimates, but to be upon the moderate side; yet if it produce one hundred thousand hogheads, its more than all the other islands we have can produce, nor can they send home so much cotton, coffee, and cinnamon.

The exports of this island to Britain and America has been as great as any island Britain has; and if it is considered that it was so wasted by a siege or war in its bowels for near four months, the burnings of plantations, houses, and sugar-works that could not be prevented in so long a war, the negroes that were made free, those taken and deserted, the destructions committed by the privateers round so extensive a coast, with four month's attention, that neither masters nor negroes could attend any plantation, it appears rather surprising that this island could send home half so much as it has done so recently after such calamity and destruction. Every man that knows any thing of a sugar-plantation must be sensible how long it will be of recovering after such misfortunes: this seems to be a confirmation of what I say of the value of Guadeloupe, rather than any proof of the contrary.

I am at the same time of opinion that the consumption of the British manufactures will be greatly increased from this island, and in a few years double what it is now, thus far I affirm from my own knowledge of the place, and what I have carefully attended to for about a year past. This short state or account of Guadaloupe I give as just and true, conform to the best of my judgment, and I must know more of it now than those who were never here at all, or gave the least attention that way, even the people of Antigua, who lay so nigh this place, and frequently at Basseterre, have often assured me that they were almost as ignorant of the value of Guadaloupe as the people of England were, and those of Jamaica know much less of it. Now which of our accounts are to be most credited, I upon the place, attentively observing every circumstance I mention, daily conversing with the people of most knowledge in those branches of trade, and long trained to it in our own islands, or those gentlemen who were never so near this place as Antigua, those who act from prejudice and interested views, jealous of their private fortunes in the other islands from the riches of Guadaloupe.

I shall say no more of the value of this island and its dependencies. If people at home will not open their eyes it is their own faults not mine, but I may be indulged to assert, that some years ago it was universally allowed that our deficiency of territory in the West-Indies was what limited and confined our trade most of any thing. Every man who wrote on the subject showed us how deficient we were in the West-Indies, how precarious our settlements there stood, how powerful the French were in those islands, how much it had raised their naval strength and trade since the treaty of Utrecht, that our colonies in North-America might prove dangerous to us, if our territory in the West-Indies were not enlarged, and more carefully attended

tended to, as there our deficiency was most sensibly felt. If these things were as true as they were universally acknowledged, surely it follows, that the first acquisitions we make ought to be in the West-Indies, where we were most weak or deficient, if the interest of Great-Britain is to be considered or made the rule. That the supplying the West-Indies properly with negroes from the coast of Africa, was what had contributed so much to the rapid progress the French made in the West-Indies, amongst these valuable islands, and the attention they gave principally to that quarter. Now let us look to the sense our own ministry understood those things in, how they considered the interest of the nation.

I am pretty confident I shall escape the censure of partiality in what immediately follows. That the present ministry who have conducted the war hitherto are the best the nation ever was blest with in the annals of history, so far as they can be looked into with any certainty, they have judged of the interest of the nation upon the most solid principles, and distinguished where her natural strength lay, and how to use it most for her advantage; no interested or private views have influenced their measures, no scramble for lucrative posts or employments has either divided them or diverted their steadiness from the true interest of the nation; no man so powerful as to be protected if he was either negligent or remiss in his duty, from the highest to the lowest, insomuch that envy and detraction are silent, and parties and factions out of countenance, if not fully reconciled. How has this ministry looked upon America and the West-Indies? In what light have they considered them? When the war first kindled in America and no where else, (though it soon broke out in Germany,) they supported America powerfully, as they knew we were stronger there naturally than France was; that France endeavouring

to supply that deficiency by sea from Old France would weaken themselves, and expose their fleets to ours; therefore our sea armaments were more than ever attended to; as our greatest strength lay there, and that the expence of such armaments is less felt by the nation than any other. America was then all the theme of the people, and the West-Indies never mentioned, but our watchful ministry cast their eyes upon the West-Indies as well as to America and Germany. They sent fleets to the coasts of Africa early, and the first conquests were there. As the French West-Indies had increased so fast by their easy supplying them with negroes from that quarter of the world; thus the first effectual foundation was early laid for subsequent structures in the West-Indies. Soon after this Cape-Briton was taken, which disabled the French from sending any succours to North-America, but at the greatest expence and risque. Our ministry sent expeditions of men and ships to the coasts of France, which obliged the French to keep many of their troops at home to guard these coasts, such troops might otherwise have cast the balance in Germany, and no measure appears to have been better judged: When the season was over for such attempts upon France, then the expedition to the West-Indies set out, unexpected by every body, entirely owing to the penetration of the ministry themselves. There a conquest was gained by six regiments only, the most important ever Britain had made for some centuries past, and the French received the severest blow. How insensibly it was received at home, and from what causes, I have hinted in one of these letters.

But this conduct of so great and able a ministry made me turn my thoughts towards the West-Indies, and, from a little reflection, I discovered all those advantages arising from such increase of territory there, as I have described to you in the course of those letters,
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and which surely had influenced our ministry in those steps they had so early taken to pave their way there, when the rest of the world, nor our countrymen at home, were either talking or thinking of it, but amusing themselves with more empty shadows. In the year 1759, the affairs of Germany seemed to require more assistance, our ministry prudently and wisely gave it, for if those affairs had gone wrong in Germany, it might have given our other victories over France in Asia, Africa, and America, a very different turn from what they will have now, by such prudent supply to Germany. The French at that period, to prevent our supporting Germany, made the most lively appearance of invading Britain with their new invented scheme of flat-bottomed boats, which they acted with more vivacity than any of their former invading schemes. But our ministry were not at all frightened by those dreams, they supported Germany; they blocked up all the ports of France in the channel, and kept a sufficient guard over Toulon; at the same time brought the militia, our natural and constitutional strength, to a most respectful and salutary state and situation. But in these circumstances it was impossible to think they could spare troops from Britain sufficient for the West-Indies. The war in America had lingered a little; General Amherst was not able to get up to Montreal before the season was gone, and General Wolf found Quebec so strongly covered by so powerful an army, that the taking of it at that juncture was next to a miracle; yet it was done, and that General greatly fell in the attempt, but will ever be remembered with honour. The conquest of that place then was both late and unexpected, so that no troops could possibly come from America to the West-Indies that season, while Montreal was still in the French hands, and their strength there not contemptible.

But now that the war in America is finished; that the French can no longer make head there; that a great part of the troops in America can be brought home, we shall soon see if our great and able ministry have relinquished the West-Indies, or continue in the sentiments they so early discovered of the importance of those islands both to Britain and France; by pushing the war in this part of the world to reduce the French sugar islands, and those esteemed neutral, where the French have governors, such as St. Lucia and Dominico. Now only is the time that we could expect such an expedition from so circumspect a ministry; for troops from England as they could not be spared from duty nearer home, so they would have been more expensive to the nation than the troops from America in their return home; those troops can compleat the conquest of these valuable islands with the least expence to the nation, and are more seasoned for the climate than those from England could possibly be; the same expence of shipping and victualing that could bring these troops home to England will bring them here, so that it is not half the expence in money, nor probably half the expence of lives.

I would not have people influenced by these unsolid conjectures, that our ministry look upon Canada as of the utmost consequence to be annexed to Great-Britain, because they pushed the reduction of it with so much vigour, as those measures might more probably proceed from its being the most prudent and effectual step for putting an end to the war that had broke out first there, and raged with most fury. To disable France from making any demands which we might think contrary to our rights and interests in that country. But after so many troops had been sent there, not without great expence, it would have appeared extremely absurd to have withdrawn those troops
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for any cause whatever, until the end was accomplished for which they were sent to that country, while the French were able to make any opposition.

If any of those well-judged expeditions against the coasts of France had taken Rochfort and Brest, every man sees of what consequence it would have been, in disabling the French fleets from disturbing our country or trade, and thereby putting an end to the war; but would it from thence follow that our ministry judged it most for our interest to keep these two places Rochfort and Brest after a peace. It is just so in the other case, and the retaining all Canada, as pointed out by some writers, may appear as absurd to our ministry, and as dangerous as the keeping of Brest in the other case; and no unsteadiness appear in their measures from taking it one year, and restoring as much of it at a peace as the French have any just title to, and consistent with our own safety there. It is a much more reasonable conjecture to think that so great and able a ministry, had early, and have still their eyes upon the West-Indies, from the early attempts upon Africa, the place so necessary for supplying the West-Indies with negroes; and then acquiring the most valuable of all the Leeward Islands, Guadaloupe, where the war had not kindled at all.

I make no doubt it was from these observations that the learned and eloquent author of the letter to two great men first wet his pen in that cause, to try if he could blind the ministry, or mislead the nation, to divert the edge of the war from those valuable sugar islands, where France was so sensibly hurt, and so unable to defend. All the nation, I believe, were generally well satisfied with the ministry, that they understood the true interest of Britain, and would follow it steadily and disinterestedly, when this great
dictator

dictator assumed the office at his own hand, and gave our ministry their instructions with a haughtiness very unbecoming, and very unsuitable to the esteem and confidence they had so justly acquired from all men of worth. As there was no visible cause for interposing with these instructions, at that time while the ministry were so successful in these most salutary measures; nothing but the dread of pushing the war in the West-Indian islands, which was so much the interest of the nation, and might be accomplished with the smallest force, could possibly influence any man to produce to the world such a spirited piece of delusion, nor could men's eyes be long blinded by the assuming the sanction of a very great man for the father of that piece, the true father, and his weighty motives were soon discovered. Canada and Guadaloupe were not the real parties in dispute; it is Great-Britain and the sugar islands she has, those interests jar in this point, and we can easily judge with which party the author has enlisted himself.

Now allow me to make some more observations, and draw a few conclusions from them. First, that if we have not a sufficiency of sugar islands to serve Great-Britain and America in sugar and rum, which I may call the necessaries of life, as no family in England can want sugar twice a day, and few in the north parts of America, can want rum as often; we ought therefore, if possible, to acquire more of the sugar islands, at least as much as to supply ourselves; though we should freely give up all the foreign markets to France, a thing very opposite to the interest of Britain, as no man will disown that it were much for our advantage, to have more of the sugar trade, and allow the French as little as we can, since it is so plain that the French naval strength has in a great measure arisen from that trade.

Secondly,

Secondly, that the West-Indian islands we have, small as they are, consume as much if not more of the produce of Great-Britain, than the American colonies do; therefore if the West-Indies were doubled at this juncture, so would the exports from England be doubled; and the whole trade betwixt Britain and the West-Indies, also the trade betwixt the West-Indies and America; the West-Indies would demand double from America they now do, and America be thereby enabled to increase her demands from England. Thus England and America profit considerably by acquiring territories in the West-Indies, but no acquisition of territory in America, can have that effect upon our West-India islands, or raise their value.

Thirdly, France draws almost all her wealth from the West-Indies, so may we; the acquiring neutral islands may in some sense remedy our deficiency, but not totally, as these are but few, and may be many years in peopleing; whereas the French islands are pretty well peopled already. If you leave the French in possession of all the islands they have now in the West-Indies, they must still remain too strong for us, and raise their naval strength with more rapidity from that quarter after the peace. The French islands being taken from them remedies our deficiency, and also diminishes their strength, it serves both ends. You can never humble the trade and naval strength of France but by taking their sugar islands from them, prune those luxuriant branches that carry the fairest and richest fruits of France, then you accomplish the end proposed.

The sugar islands must always be dependant, but America as she rises to maturity, may endanger our trade and liberty both. It must be absurd to say or think, that when America exceeds us in numbers of people, that she will nevertheless continue dependant,
because

because independancy is grasped at by all mankind since their first creation : how impatient are all the children in England, as they advance in years, to be independant of their natural and fond parents ; does not the common conversation of all companies in North-America run upon that subject ; when they can arrive at independancy, they wait for it, and expect it with as much impatience, as a girl of fifteen does for her marriage to break loose from the restraint of a watchful mother. Let no man flatter himself with those empty phantoms, or fancy that he can alter the nature and passions of men, or make them more fond of dependancy in a collective body, than individuals are : it must appear equally absurd to imagine, that North-America as she advances in agriculture, and encreases in numbers of people, will not also encrease in industry, arts, trades, manufactures and sciences ; in a country where nature has collected together such profusion of all the materials and conveniencies that can invite to such industry, more than any country we know of ; and where liberty blossoms and flourishes, with more natural and brilliant lustre, than ever it did in any new established colonies that we read of since the creation of the world : such vain, unnatural, and airy delusions can never have place amongst rational people, who have made the least reflection upon human nature, or observed the uniform experience of past ages.

But if the voice of our country, should still cry so giddily after that false and destructive ambition of extent of territory so often prejudicial to other states, yet much more so to Britain, and that Canada, at a treaty of peace, were added to the extensive possessions she has in North America, what would be the consequence, many, both fatal and dangerous to Great-Britain would ensue ; one is most obvious, that we are told how fast we would multiply in people, and extend ourselves
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over so rich and extensive countries; one effect that must surely follow, therefore if we cannot at present, or could not before the war, serve ourselves with these articles of sugar, rum, and other produce of the West-Indies, we must feel that deficiency more, when our demands for those articles, will be so much encreased from North-America. The great growth of North-America, in people and extent of territory, unlimited and uninterrupted from the acquisition of Canada, must surely double the value of the West-Indian islands, and enrich those kingdoms most who have the largest possessions there, *viz.* France, but it can never enrich our own islands as they have more consumption already than they are able to answer, and by far the highest prices. The great encrease of North-America then must have this effect, to encrease the value of the French sugar islands, where her greatest wealth, trade, and naval strength lies; it must also have this other effect, that as North-America encreases in people, it must rival Great-Britain in all her trades and manufactures, in which the greatest share of her wealth consists, so that these acquisitions in North-America as projected, must both enrich France, and impoverish Britain to a great degree, an effect very different from what was proposed by the war, and very different from what any wise people would chuse to reap, as the harvest of so glorious and successful a war.

Acquisitions in the West Indies only can aggrandize Great-Britain, and seems to be what so able a ministry very early pointed at. From that consideration of itself, the nation might have been convinced, that it was their interest, and I believe they generally are so; some few of the many proprietors of those sugar islands we have, may be misled from self-views, but the generality of them I am confident, have sounder heads and honest hearts, than to persist in those obvious errors, when they take time to reflect more coolly
and

and impartially. If any of them continue still to oppose the acquisition of the sugar islands, every man of common sense must see that it is their own private views and interest that spirits them on; thus to oppose the only probable view of aggrandizing Great-Britain, and humbling France her greatest rival, least their private fortunes in the few sugar islands we have should suffer a little diminution or abatement.

If it was not very vain to give those gentlemen any advice, I would humbly offer one; To consider seriously whether 5000*l.* a year, upon the surest and most honourable footing, is not preferable to 6000*l.* a year upon the most precarious tenure that can be imagined. I would wish them to attend to the new favourite play, *The Siege of Aquileia*, that they may see how those great Roman people behaved; young men in the bloom of youth giving themselves up a sacrifice for their country, parents giving up their children to death for that cause, children who did so much honour to the father who begot them, as well as to the mother who gave them birth. Those West-Indians may learn from the stage, if no where else, how shamefully vain their pretensions are to imitate or equal the Romans; when they would betray their country for a little precarious and imaginary gain to themselves: however, these are but a few, and I hope never will influence the many. We may be comforted from reflecting that in the present times we have many instances of Roman virtue and fortitude in our countrymen, and blest with a ministry who may be justly placed on a level with the most eminent of the Roman consuls, Cicero not excepted.

I have in the course of these letters given you my sentiments of the interests of our country in her present situation, a period the most important and interesting of any we have seen, in which the future grandeur,

deur, wealth, liberty, and honour of Britain in a great measure depends upon the resolutions she now takes with regard to America and the West-Indies, and I am not inclined at present to say any more on the subject, for prejudices arising from interested views can neither be silenced, nor will they own conviction; only thus much, that you and your West-Indian false brethren can have no handle to say that this is written with much partiality or animated with any fallies of passion or prejudice, but a plain narration of facts, and the clear natural consequences that follow from these facts.

I am, &c.

Guadaloupe,
December 12, 1760.

F I N I S.

